The Attorney General and popular election in Mexico: a necessary debate

Abstract

This article analyzes the feasibility of electing the Attorney General of the Republic by popular vote in Mexico, considering international experiences, empirical evidence, and the current national institutional context. Using a qualitative-comparative approach, it examines the risks and benefits of this model and proposes alternative institutional designs that strengthen democratic legitimacy without compromising institutional autonomy. The methodology combines the historical-evolutionary method to analyze the trajectory of the Mexican Public Prosecutor's Office (MP) since 1917, the legal-dogmatic method to examine the current regulatory framework, the comparative method to evaluate international experiences (particularly the U.S. model of elected prosecutors), and the analytical method to integrate available evidence. Three historical moments are studied: the institutionalization of the MP in 1917, the reform of the accusatory system in 2008, and the establishment of constitutional autonomy in 2014. The data reveals a persistent gap between citizens and law enforcement institutions, necessitating an exploration of mechanisms for democratic legitimation. Comparative analysis shows that the U.S. experience, while viable, entails risks of penal populism and the influence of campaign finance. The 2025 Mexican judicial election, with low turnout (13%) and over 26 million invalid votes, illustrates the challenges of democratizing technical institutions. The central conclusion is cautious: the popular election of the Attorney General, without prior structural redesign, can politicize the process and compromise independence. Hybrid models incorporating limited and verifiable citizen participation are proposed as more viable alternatives in the current Mexican context.